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Federal Education Mandates: A Constitutional
Renovation of No Child Left Behind
Ryan Bakow1

I

n July 2011, a massive cheating scandal in the Atlanta public education system shocked the nation and became fodder for critics
of federal education programs. Governor Nathan Deal ordered
an investigation that eventually implicated one hundred and seventyeight teachers and principals, alleging that they had systematically
changed answers on standardized tests for more than ten years. Prior
to the school district’s exposure, Atlanta was thought to be advancing considerably: Atlanta’s superintendent, Beverly Hall, was named
Superintendent of the Year in 2009. The city was considered a model
for the success of the No Child Left Behind Act2 (NCLB) legislation,
when in actuality, this reputation was largely falsified.3
Atlanta’s failure is one unfortunate example of the problems
associated with federal education mandates like NCLB; it also demonstrates how such mandates can be a violation of federalism and
may even encroach on sacrosanct constitutional boundaries.4 The
Supreme Court has ruled repeatedly that public education is with-
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No Child Left Behind Act 115 § 1425 (2002).
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See Are They Learning? Rampant Cheating by Teachers in Atlanta’s
Schools Hurts Students and Destroys Trust, N.Y. Times, July 17, 2011, at
SR11; see also Kim Severson, A Scandal of Cheating, and a Fall From
Grace, N.Y. Times, September 7, 2011, at A16.
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See The Role of Federal Mandates in Intergovernmental Relations: A
Preliminary ACIR Report, U.S. Advisory Comm’n on Intergovernmental
Relations (Feb. 16, 2012 11:00 AM), http://www.library.unt.edu/gpo/acir/
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in the domain of the state,5 but the reality is that under the current
system states are mostly reliant on federal funding to support their
schools. Accordingly, federal funds have essentially become an
instrument of control used alternatively for reward and punishment.
This reliance on federal funds provides the federal government with
significant latitude in its legislative power and scope. In fact, federal
funding is often a sufficient incentive for states to accept federal programs which may or may not be properly under federal jurisdiction.
This “carrot-and-stick” approach is problematic in two key
ways: first, mandates frequently do not include enough funding for
states to accomplish the federal government’s goals. These unfunded
mandates place undue burden on the states and directly oppose the
“general welfare” intended by the Spending Clause.6 Second, even
when federal mandates are sufficiently funded, the importance of
the attached funding creates a situation where the mandate supersedes state education law; thus, it blurs the line between mandate
and legislation.7 Essentially, the federal government legislates under
the guise of funded mandates. The constitutionality of this practice
is unclear and will be the primary issue addressed within this article.
Federally funded, and by extension unfunded, mandates have
the force of law and therefore should be subject to constitutional
constraints. This article examines recent Supreme Court decisions
that discuss the role of the federal government in public education.
Recent court challenges regarding NCLB offer an excellent case
study concerning the validity of federal mandates. These cases
indicate that federal mandates have the force of law due to the
5

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) In the majority opinion, Justice Rehnquist argued that if Congress has power to regulate both crime
and education, as they seem to be implying, then there is no end to their
power under the Commerce Clause. Thus, he affirmed the decision of The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals finding that in banning guns from school
areas Congress had exceeded its constitutional power.

6

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (James Madison noted that the General
Welfare Clause is exceptionally broad and may be used to increase or
centralize power. Most often a statute is considered the general welfare if
it is universally applicable as well as generally supported).

7

Connecticut v. Spellings, 453 F.Supp.2d 459 (2006).
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exceptional leverage created by federal funding. In most cases, the
consequence of non-compliance is a withdrawal of funding for key
programs, effectively debilitating the state’s education programs.8 If
federal mandates have the force of law, it follows that federal mandates ought to operate within the Constitution similar to standard
law. Therefore, federal mandates should not be acceptable with
respect to education.
I will organize the article as follows: (I) First, I examine federal
mandates and explain why constitutionality ought to be the primary
consideration of their legality. This will include the argument that
federal mandates can gain the force of law. (II) Next, I demonstrate
that NCLB is an example of a coercive federal mandate, since the
opt-out was unrealistic and in most cases would have been debilitating to local education systems. (III) I then apply several recent
decisions to the question of the constitutionality of federal education mandates (specifically NCLB), showing that significant judicial
support exists for the position that education is strictly a state issue.
(IV) Finally, I consider certain implications of this position on both
federal funding as well as future court decisions concerning federalism and education policy.

I. Federal Mandates:
For many years, the Federal Legislature has used federal mandates to implement national policies and programs. These mandates
are similar to law in their construction and passage and are obeyed
as law with few exceptions. Federal mandates are passed as a part of
legislative bills or joint resolutions and are intricately tied with decisions made by the Appropriations Committee.9 Mandates are a func8

South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) In the few cases where states
have not fully complied with federal mandates, the consequences have
most often been financial. The exception is when the federal government
grants a waiver to that state such as in the recent case of President Obama
granting 10 state waivers concerning the No Child Left Behind Act.

9

Clark G. Radatz, Funding State and Federal Mandates, Legislative
Reference Bureau, http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lrb/pubs/ib/96ib3.pdf (Last
visited Feb. 2, 2012).
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tion of budgets and are frequently made a prerequisite for receiving
funding.10 Federal mandates have steadily increased in number since
1960. In January 1996, the Advisory Commission of Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) observed “more than 200 separate mandates… involving about 170 federal laws reaching into every nook
and cranny of state and local activities.” In a separate report, they
identified “3,500 decisions involving state and local governments
relating to more than 100 federal laws….”11 Mandates have become
an intricate part of federal oversight although they are technically
not law.
Federal laws and mandates are very similar in both their method
of passage and their power; the principal differences between them
are the consequences associated with noncompliance. For instance,
if a state were to disregard a federal law, the matter would likely go
to a federal court which then decides whether to enforce it (often
by force) or to support the state.12 On the other hand, the federal
government cannot forcibly compel a state to uphold such a federal mandate; they only have the power to withdraw the associated
funding.13 There are two types of mandates: unfunded mandates
are those law-like institutions and statutes, which are given to the
states without compensation or funding but may be attached to other
program funding (such as federal highway provisions), and funded
mandates, which are given with the necessary funding to carry out
the proposed action.
10

Id. at 3.

11

The Role of Federal Mandates in Intergovernmental Relations: A Preliminary ACIR Report, U.S. Advisory Comm’n on Intergovernmental
Relations (Feb. 16, 2012 11:00 AM), http://www.library.unt.edu/gpo/acir/
Mandates.html.
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Wiley A. Branton, Little Rock Revisited: Desegregation to Resegregation, 52 The Journal of Negro Education 3 (1983) (After the landmark
supreme court case Brown v. Board of Education, Dwight D. Eisenhower
ordered the national guard to compel the admittance of nine black students
to a Little Rock High School. On their first day, the students attended class
under armed guard).

13

South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
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Unfunded mandates must be accompanied by legal justification
as to why there is an absence of funds, except when the mandate is an
enumerated federal power. For example, in United States v. Lopez,14
the Court ruled that Congress had not provided “sufficient justification” of a substantial relationship between the Gun-Free School
Zones Act15 and congressional commerce power, thus showing that
the courts still enforce constitutional compliance. This tradition was
later codified in the 1996 Mandate Reform bill16 in which Congress
sought “to end the imposition, in the absence of full consideration
by Congress, of federal mandates on State, local, and tribal governments without adequate federal funding.”17 In cases where the funded or unfunded mandate is not an enumerated federal power, states
must be given the necessary funds to carry out the federal program.
Although federal mandates themselves are not binding, they are
often part of legislative acts such as bills and joint resolutions.18 State
and local governments have in the past, been able to ‘opt-out’ of
federal mandates. However, because they are connected in appropriations to significant funding, sometimes unrelated to the law in
question, states rarely attempt noncompliance. When such attempts
are made, however, federal mandates may carry considerable repercussions. For example, in 1987 the state of South Dakota sued the
federal government over the loss of federal highway funds. This
punishment was administered in response to the state’s refusal to
change the minimal drinking age to 21 as was required by federal
statute.19 Ultimately, the courts upheld the federal mandate because

14

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).

15

Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, H.R. 3757, 101st Cong. § 1702
(1990).

16

Unfunded Mandate Reform Act (UMRA), 2 U.S.C. § 1501 (1995).

17

Id at 2.

18

Id at 3.

19

National Minimum Drinking Age Act, 23 U.S.C.S. § 158 (1984).
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they considered it to be in the general welfare.20 In order to keep
millions of dollars of necessary funding for their highways, South
Dakota was forced to accept the federally mandated change although
it was against the wishes of the state.21
This case marked a turning point in the way in which Congress
created and administered statutes, ushering in the age of federal
mandates. Since South Dakota v. Dole, there have been hundreds of
federal mandates and, most noteworthy, almost uniform compliance.
As one of the scholastically worst school districts in the nation, the
Atlanta school district had little chance for success within the federal
system. Poor testing and dropout rates would have resulted in school
closures and significant funding cuts. Why would the state willfully
enter into such a losing system? Why would they sacrifice probity
for the appearance of improvement rather than customizing a state
system? The answer is the same as in the South Dakota case: there
is no reasonable alternative funding outside of the related federal
mandate. The financial consequences of noncompliance are simply
too great.
Significantly, the 1996 Mandate Reform Bill does not provide
any meaningful restriction for federally funded mandates. In fact, in
the last several decades funded mandates have grown significantly
in proportion to statute. Additionally, the implementation of funded
mandates has often been upheld by the courts, as in South Dakota v.
Dole. In one noteworthy part of the majority decision the judges state
that, “economic coercion could be a factor that invalidates an otherwise legitimate exercise of the spending power.”22 Despite ruling
in favor of the government, the judges recognized that the price
of non-compliance could be high enough to be considered compul20

South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). The secretary of transportation Elizabeth Dole. The petitioners alleged that this statute violated the
spending clause found in U.S. constitution article 1 section 8 clause 1. In
their decision, the appellate court upheld the defendants saying that this
statute was constitutional pursuant to the “general welfare” of the several
states.

21

Court Backs Law Withholding Highway Funds, Houston Chronicle News
Service, Jun. 23, 1987, at A4.

22

South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 533-534 (1987).
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sion, although this threshold was never explicitly created. In United
States v. Butler, Judge Owens, in the majority opinion stated that,
“The power to confer or withhold unlimited benefits is the power to
coerce or destroy.”23 Ruling on agricultural subsidies, the reasoning
of the court was as follows: “If the cotton grower elects not to accept
the benefits, he will receive less for his crops; those who receive payments will be able to undersell him. The result may well be financial
ruin.”24 Again, the courts concluded that funded mandates have the
potential to reach compulsory levels.
Despite the possibility of becoming de facto legislation, federally funded mandates are rarely challenged or relinquished. Thus,
there has been little need for the federal government to justify its use
of mandates, except in cases where they are unfunded and non-enumerated. This is likely the case because federal funding has become
increasingly vital to state government functionality. That is, although
federally funded mandates have become more and more compulsive,
the states are less and less inclined to challenge them due to the risk
of losing millions—and in some cases billions—of dollars in federal funding. There is nothing constitutional which prohibits federal
coercion of state law via economic or other incentives. On the other
hand, the courts have made it clear that there exists a point at which
federal incentives essentially gain the force of law.25 In individual
cases, this happens when rejecting payments may lead to “financial
ruin;”26 for states, these conditions are the same. If rejecting federal
funding as a result of opting out of a federal program cripples or
threatens ruin on the state system, then such a mandate has gained
the force of law.
The deficiency in past court rulings is that there is no definitive
estimate of the threshold where a funded federal mandate becomes
compulsive. However, there have been several cases which dem23

US v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 71 (1936). In this decision, Owens clarifies that
while Congress may tax and apportion funding for the ‘general welfare’,
they may not use taxation as a means of control over state powers.

24

Id. at 71.

25

Connecticut v. Spellings, 453 F.Supp.2d 459 (2006).

26

Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 71 (1936) at 71.
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onstrate that any system of federal funding that is contingent on a
set of requirements, and which has no viable alternative, must be
compulsive. On the other hand, would an alternative opt-in system
which receives equivalent federal funding be any less compulsive?
The answer is that federal funding in any form has the potential to
create dependency. In the case of education, Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) and the subsequent No Child Left
Behind Act provide hundreds of millions of dollars in federal funds
to states each year. States that opt-out of this system would lose their
funding, and this would seem to be in violation of the General Welfare Clause of the Constitution. In short, if a funded federal mandate
is not inherently in the federal domain, and if it exacts debilitating
penalties in case of non-compliance, then it becomes compulsive and
thus non-constitutional. This will be discussed further in section IV.

II. No Child Left Behind:
One of the most important federal mandates for the U.S. education system is NCLB.27 Conceived by the Bush administration, NCLB
amended and reauthorized the already existing ESEA.28 The purpose
of NCLB was to “ensure that all children have a fair, equal, and significant opportunity to obtain a high-quality education.”29 NCLB is
a “standards” based education reform, and accordingly requires all
schools that receive federal funding to comply with national standardized testing and school evaluation. The federal government creates—and states administer—requisite standardized testing. School
benchmarks are created by the federal government and administered

27

No Child Left Behind Act 115 § 1425 (2002).

28

The Elementary and Secondary Education Act 79 § 27 (1965). ESEA was
renewed several times in the legislature, the most recent reincarnation being No Child Left Behind.

29

20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2001).
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by the states.30 Additionally, this act reauthorizes Title I funding,31
mandates that teachers be “highly qualified,” institutes a new reading program, redistributes education funding to focus on low income
areas, and allows the schools greater leeway in their use of federal
funds. All states were automatically required to implement this federal program in place of ESEA.32
Both the accolades and punishments in the program were implemented via financial incentives, much as other federal mandates.
Unfortunately, the incentive structure ultimately had some negative
consequences. In the Atlanta School District, teachers felt pressured
to keep test-scores artificially high.33 In this case, the schools and
students were compelled to make improvements according to NCLB
in order to extend and maintain their funding. As a result, they had to
resort to cheating in order to keep their jobs and their schools open.
It may be that fundamental change in a school’s academic progress
requires more than just an increase in funding and more than just
a few years. The quality of an education system likely has to do
with the socio-economic, cultural, and familial environment to which
the child is exposed. If this is the case, then it stands to reason that
education policy must be made and adapted to local circumstances.
Educators and lawmakers in Georgia and other areas understood that
NCLB would ultimately limit their funding whether they complied
or not. Their actions epitomize the essence of NCLB, which is that it
has the force of law. Not abiding by the requirements of this federal
mandate, or opting out, would have resulted in the loss of significant
funding; in most instances, a majority of state education funding. It
is a case where the “power to confer or withhold unlimited benefits is
the power to coerce or destroy.”34
30

Id. (This act was initially accompanied by 42.2$ billion in funding which
increased until about 2007 when there were significant spending cuts).

31

20 U.S.C. § 101 (2001) (Title I funding are moneys that are apportioned
specifically to low-income children in order to equalize the educational
experience).

32

Supra 27.

33

No Child Left Behind Act 115 § 1425 (2002).

34

Supra 23, at 71.
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The financial incentives themselves are a systemic problem
which applies to federal mandates in general; however, NCLB has
had other significant problems since its inception. The principal
problem as presented in appellate courts was the lack of funding
for certain NCLB requirements. This has manifested itself in two
ways: (1) Higher standards and specific tests required by the act were
found by some states to cost more than the money allocated; and (2)
many of the provisions were not funded at all, thereby increasing the
burden on the states.35 Ultimately this resulted in several lawsuits, of
which none was more definitive than State of Connecticut v. Margaret Spellings, Secretary of Education.36
While many states simply accepted the No Child Left Behind
Act because of the financial incentives or for other reasons, for many
states it required significant reformation. Connecticut’s educational
system was one of the most successful in the country because of their
high standards and state-specific testing. NCLB, however, required
that the state make non-essential changes, for example implementing
additional testing. Connecticut attempted to receive a waiver from
the Secretary of Education, Margaret Spellings, because it already
had its own standardized testing that ensured test scores well above
the national average, but requests for waivers were denied. Thus,
Connecticut became the first state to file a lawsuit against the federal
government because it lacked the funding necessary to carry out the
required annual testing for elementary schools. Connecticut’s complaint was that the federal government had violated the unfunded
mandates prohibition of NCLB by requiring Connecticut’s schools
to comply with unfunded standards.37 Furthermore, the cost of noncompliance was significant. The federal government could have
withheld $435,946,380; this represents a substantial portion of the
state’s education budget. This federal funding is tied to Title I funding, and was used as leverage to force the state to accept NCLB.38
35

Larry Abramson, Funding Stagnant for No Child Left Behind Program,
NPR, (Last visited Feb. 16, 2012).

36

Connecticut v. Spellings, 453 F. Supp. 2d 459 (2006).

37

Id. at 474.

38

Id. at 473.

Federal Education Mandates

97

Thus, in August 2005, Connecticut challenged the federal government’s use of the Spending Clause.
The underlying question was whether the spending clause justified this educational program which would otherwise be left to the
states generally. Connecticut v. Spellings is a persuasive example
of the devastating consequences of non-compliance with a federal
mandate. Here the federal government had attempted to coerce a
state, in lieu of compelling them with statute, to act contrary to its
own will by withholding funds. The text of NCLB specifically states
that the state would not have to pay for implementation of the Act.
However, the federal government did not fund up to $41 million of
the actual cost.39 Additionally, non-compliance would have taken
away federal funding which had existed previously, essentially a tax
on the state. Despite this apparent contradiction, the federal government continued to justify the use of federal mandates in NCLB with
the Spending Clause.
In order for the federal government to justify NCLB pursuant
to the Spending Clause, it should be required to demonstrate that
NLCB is providing for the “general welfare” of the states.40 Connecticut needed to either show that this mandate violated the 1996
Unfunded Mandate Law or that it had become coercive in accordance with South Dakota v. Dole.41 As discussed in section one,
appellate case law offers no definition as to how many federal dollars
must be at stake in order to qualify as undue coercion. The Fourth
Circuit, however, has acknowledged that the theory of coercion is

39

William J. Mathis, The Cost of Implementing the Federal No Child Left
Behind Act, Peabody Journal of Education http://www.schoolfunding.
info/news/ federal/3-14-05ctnclbstudy.php3 (Feb. 2, 2012).

40

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. (The General Welfare Clause, as was previously discussed, includes the power to tax, pay debts, and provide for
the common defense and general welfare of citizens of the United States.
Congress has often used this to justify unfunded and funded mandates
since they are supporting the states and providing funds for public goods.
This was used as justification in several of the NCLB court cases).

41

South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
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viable and that its explanation is persuasive.42 As such, it is an argument well-grounded in the Tenth Amendment’s reservation “to the
States respectively, or to the people” of those “powers not delegated
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States.”43 The State of Connecticut may very well be the first state
filing suit to have reached the phantom threshold between funding
and coercion.
Connecticut did not win the case44 because they did not adequately show that NCLB lacked required funding. However, the decision
showed that the education mandate had coercive force because it carried significant consequences in case of non-compliance. The Court’s
action also makes it clear that they considered NCLB the equivalent
of law. Similar cases followed the Connecticut ruling which further
substantiated the limitations inherent in federal mandates. Pontiac
v. Spellings claimed that NCLB was simply an unfunded mandate.45
The plaintiffs, the National Education Association along with several school districts from Michigan, Texas and Vermont, alleged that
although NCLB promises to cover all related costs, the states are
forced to assume a significant financial burden. On the other hand,
the cost of non-compliance was even greater. These cases exemplify
the debilitating tax which many federal mandates would incur in the
case of non-compliance. Using federal mandates, Congress has the
ability to circumvent the frontiers of its jurisdiction.

42

West Virginia v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services, 289 F.3d 281,
286 (4th Cir. 2002).

43

U.S. Const. amend. X.

44

Connecticut v. Spellings, 549 F. Supp. 2d 161, 161 (U.S. Dist. Ct. for the
Dist. of Conn. 2008).

45

Sch. Dist. v. Spellings, No. 90-345, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29253, at 2
(E.D. Mich. Nov. 3, 2005) (addressing the legitimacy of the funding status
of the No Child Left Behind Act), rev’d 584 F.3d 253 (2009).
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III. Enumerated Federal Education Powers?
Education is not a specifically enumerated power given to Congress.46 Administration over a state scholastic system should fall
under the authority of the Tenth Amendment.47 However, other
constitutional clauses have been used at various times to justify the
use of federal education mandates, especially the General Welfare
Clause and the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.48 Such justification is acceptable so long as it is certified by the courts. The
problem is that the technical difference between a law and a mandate
has eliminated the need for constitutional oversight.
Laws have been justified most often under the Commerce Clause
of the Constitution.49 This justification has dramatically expanded
federal power, but recent court decisions have also provided important insight into the defined limits of enumerated powers.50 There
are several cases which required the Courts to specify congressional
legislating limits. Two of the most influential cases that have been

46

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).

47

439 N.E.2d 359, 370 (N.Y. 1982) [hereinafter Levittown] (Fuchsberg, J.,
dissenting) (stating that “primary concern for education was to be that of
the States rather than of the Union”).

48

See Stephen Monroe, Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: “Reasonable Measures” Giving “Due Deference” to School Boards’ Decisions
in Cases Involving the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 5
Seventh Circuit Rev. 581, 581 (2010).

49

See P. John Kozyris, Some Observations on State Regulation of Multistate
Takeovers — Controlling Choice of Law Through the Commerce Clause,
14 Del. J. Corp. L. 499, 511 (Spring, 1989).

50

U.S. Const, art. I, § 8, cl. 3. (the power given to Congress to regulate
interstate commerce. This clause was not enacted very often in the first
several decades of the United States; however, it has since been regularly
used as a means of expanding congressional power. The Court has recognized that these powers must not infringe on the proper balance of federalism, although the history of the Court suggests a search for a defined limit
on the powers enumerated in the Commerce Clause.)
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centered on the Commerce Clause are United States v. Lopez51 and
San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez.52 The decisions in these
court cases both clearly state that Congress does not have constitutional authority over state education.53 Therefore, this power should
be left to the states under Tenth Amendment grounds.54
In the first case of US v. Lopez, Congress sought to extend its
authority over certain aspects of education pursuant to the Commerce Clause. At stake was the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 199055
which prohibited an individual from knowingly possessing a firearm
within school zone. In both the majority and minority opinion, the
justices clarify that education is not a federal power.56 The federal
government was unable to show that the Gun-Free School Zones Act
51

Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549 (1995). (In 1992 Alfonzo Lopez Jr. was a 12th
grade student attending Edison high school in the state of Texas. Lopez
brought a loaded revolver with him to school and while at school Lopez
was confronted by school authorities. Lopez was then charged with violation of Gun-Free School Act. Lopez appealed the charges brought against
him, claiming the ruling exceeded Congress’s power under the Commerce
Clause. The Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeals decision in favor
of Lopez.)

52

San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1993). (The
lawsuit was filed against the school district of San Antonio and surrounding areas, by parents of the Edgewood Concerned Parent Association.
The Supreme Court held that a school-financing system based on local
property taxes was not an unconstitutional violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s equal protection clause. The majority opinion stated that
the Apellees did not sufficiently prove that education is a fundamental
right, that textually existed within the US Constitution, and could thereby
through the 14th Amendment to the Constitution, be applied to the several
States. The Court also found that the financing system was not subject to
strict scrutiny.)

53

Levittown, 439 N.E.2d at 370 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting) (stating that
“primary concern for education was to be that of the States rather than of
the Union”).

54

Id.

55

Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, H.R. 3757, 101st Cong. § 1702
(1990).

56

Id.
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was related to commerce, and without such a justification, the Court
ruled that the government had exceeded its jurisdiction. This decision
is a precedent for limiting government to strictly enumerated powers.
The second influential court case was San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez.57 This court case was centered on the division
of financial inequalities within the Texas public school system. The
wealthy areas of San Antonio and across Texas were able to provide a better education to their students than poorer areas, such as
in Edgewood, an area near San Antonio. The judges in this case
found that the appellees did not prove sufficiently that education was
a fundamental right. In other words, that the states have jurisdiction
over the administration of their own education system, including the
associated funding.
These cases show that the Court has historically sided against
education as a federal power. Such decisions suggest that the federal government has no power to legislate or impose regulations on
the education system of the several states; this also has implications
for federal funding. Although the implications of constitutionality of
funding will not be fully considered in this paper, it is the author’s
opinion that federal funding of education is not a violation of any
constitutional power so long as it is not conditional on unjustified
federal programs. If funding is constitutional, or allowed under the
General Welfare Clause, then all states ought to receive comparable funding.

IV. Eliminating Federal Mandates on Constitutional Grounds:
The important question in these cases is consistently related
to federalism. In one such case, West Virginia v. U.S. Department
of Health & Human Services,58 the state of West Virginia sued the
federal government claiming that the federal Medicaid program,
which required states to adopt an estate recovery program to recoup
Medicaid expenditures from deceased beneficiaries, violated the
57

San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1993).

58

West Virginia v. United States Department of Health & Human Services,
289 F.3d 281, 1-2 (4th Cir. 2002).
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Tenth Amendment because it was “unduly coercive.”59 Although the
Fourth Circuit declined to recognize any such federal coercion, it
acknowledged that when dealing with federal mandates the coercion
theory was valid. In the majority decision the judges stated that, “A
law or congressional policy which is unduly coercive may violate
the Tenth Amendment if it deprives the State of any reasonable ability to regulate an area that is traditionally left to the State and outside the federal government’s enumerated powers.”60 This is a clear
statement that the federal government’s powers are bounded. This
decision also indicates that the deprivation of state power, whether
because of law or otherwise, is a violation of the Tenth Amendment.
A second influential court ruling comes from the state of New
York, in the case of Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy.61 Theodore and Pearl Murphy were the parents of a
special needs child who felt that the public high school of Arlington
was unacceptable. Accordingly, they placed him in a private school,
but the Arlington Central School District was unwilling to pay the
related expenses. The question brought to the Fourth Circuit was
whether or not the prevailing party ought to be reimbursed for expert
witness fees. The parents claimed that this was implied in the federal
Individual with Disabilities Act (IDEA) which stated that the prevailing party would be rewarded “reasonable attorneys’ fees.”62 The
courts reversed precedent and argued that the federal statute made
under the auspices of the spending clause should be interpreted narrowly. This is another example of how the courts recognize that federal power ought to be restricted in cases where mandates are not
based in constitutional law.
Several interesting things were considered in Murphy which
are applicable to the present discussion. The Fourth Circuit in their
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majority decision state that the conditions for federal funds must
be set out “unambiguously.”63 In fact, they say that, “Legislation
enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the nature of a
contract,” and therefore, to be bound by “federally imposed conditions,” recipients of federal funds must accept them “voluntarily and
knowingly.”64 The courts here emphasize that federal mandates must
be absolutely clear in their language both for the states and the courts
who must enforce the agreement. However, although the language of
the mandate may be contract-like, the state has little control over the
terms of the agreement. Therefore, the only authority under which
such a stipulation could be made under is constitutional. If this is
not the case, then such an agreement may be excessively and
unjustly burdensome to state functions and may be reviewed by the
Supreme Court. 65
The argument of this paper rests squarely on the back of the previously mentioned majority opinion by Judge Owens who said that
“the power to confer or withhold unlimited benefits is the power to
coerce or destroy.”66 Another notorious Court decision stated something similar, that “the power to tax is the power to destroy.”67 Clearly the idea of coercion as a form of enforcement has and continues to
have broad application. Previous cases have shown that the federal
mandate system, and more specifically the withdrawal of funds as
a retributive act, can be excessively burdensome to states and individuals. Such cases have also demonstrated the destructive power of
the withholding of federal funds for vital programs such as highway
maintenance or school systems. Thus, it is up to the courts to act on
precedent and more firmly establish the balance of federalism via
creating a definitive threshold of coercive federal mandates.
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Having established that federal mandates have the potential to
be compulsory even to the point of being as powerful as law, they
ought to be under the same restrictions as law. In regards to legislative authority, Congress is strictly restrained by the Constitution,
including federal amendments. The Tenth Amendment provides a
clear division between federal and state jurisdiction; however, federal mandates effectively bypass this separation of powers. Congress’
ability to enforce its will via financial sanctions effectively limits
state sovereignty and extends federal oversight. Therefore, both
funded and unfunded federal mandates, as acts of Congress, should
be strictly limited to only those powers enumerated in the United
States Constitution.

V. Conclusion:
The use of federal mandates began with the good intention of
administering federal funding for vital state programs such as education, but is now become a means of managing anything considered
a national issue.68 In this article, the authority of congress to distribute federal funding is not in question. Rather, the primary issue is
one of federalism. Given that federal funding can in some cases be
so great as to be compulsory, and that the removal of this funding
as a consequence of non-compliance can devastate state programs
which have grown dependent on funding patterns, one is led to conclude that federal mandates have power similar to law. On the other
hand, federal mandates are not restrained by constitutional limits as
are statutes. As a result, federal mandates given by Congress have
the theoretical power to circumvent the institution of federalism by
imposing almost any sort of mandate on state governments using
financial incentives.
The No Child Left Behind Act is one such case where the federal
government mandated an action which as a law would have been
outside of constitutional jurisdiction.69 The subsequent legal action
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taken by Connecticut and others illustrates that, at least from a state
perspective, the withdrawal of federal funding constitutes a destructive and therefore coercive act. It is for this that one must conclude
that No Child Left Behind has the force of law. Using the means of
federally funded mandates, the federal government has successfully
circumvented the Tenth Amendment and is administering a statelevel program.70
It is apparent that the judicial debate concerning the legitimacy of federal mandates has not gone far enough. The Unfunded
Mandate Reform Act stipulated that federal mandates must cover
the costs of the programs which they implement;71 however, it has
only been recent Court decisions which have recognized the possibility that federal funding could be coercive. Congress habitually
administers programs via funded mandates which are not explicitly
defined federal powers and which may or may not be welcome by
the states. The cases highlighted in this article show that this has
previously been a non-issue because there are very few states who
would risk their funding by not accepting government mandates. For
those states who have challenged these provisions, there has been
only lukewarm success. Thus to preserve the fundamental role of
federalism, there needs to be a new discussion in the courts which
defines coercive funding and establishes a hard precedent for the use
of federal mandates.
In the absence of a definitive threshold that discriminates
between coercive and non-coercive federal mandates, the courts
ought to recognize that coercive mandates exist. While funding may
be provided by the federal government in accordance with the general welfare, there must be recognition that attaching a significant
portion of federal funds to a mandate gives that mandate law-like
properties. Additionally, taking away even trivial federal funding
from states as a penalty creates inequality between communities,
which is opposed to the “general” welfare. In short, federal mandates
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cannot be treated as contracts, or if they are, they must be considered
as a legislative act. Therefore, it is the author’s recommendation that
federally funded mandates should be under the same constitutional
restrictions as is federal law. Following such a standard will provide
much needed clarity concerning federally mandated action and will
reinforce the institution of federalism, especially as it pertains
to education.

